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An address delivered under the title of "The Natural Law and Private
and Religious Schools" at the Fourth Annual Conference on the Natural
Law, held by the Guild of Catholic Lawyers of New York, December
15, 1956, in the Auditorium of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York.
LAW AND THE PAROCHIAL SCHOOL:
A FORMU LATION OF CONFLICTING
POSITIONS
JOHN C. HAYES*
T HE PROPER LEGAL RELATIONSHIP of the American States to sectarian
religious instruction (whether afforded on the periphery of the public
school curriculum at the elementary ,and secondary levels, or as the core
of the total instruction 'in parochial schools at the same levels) is the
subject of disagreement. In fact, there are few topics today of which so
much has been said by so many from such divergent points of view.
The popular expression of the current status of federal constitutional
law on this topic represents the State as saying to all sectarian religious
groups: "I am a neutral, and my attitude is hands ofl. So I won't take
any part in sectarian religious instruction. But if your group wants to
give such instruction, go ahead. I won't hinder you, but I won't help you
either." The basic reason for this neutrality is a keen awareness of the
utter absence of competence on the part of the State in the field of
religion.
It is, moreover, the popular impression that this American constitu-
tional position, thus popularly expressed, is a very acceptable and reason-
able compromise or resultant between two conflicting extremist positions,
which in turn are popularly expressed as follows: (a) a Natural Law
position, purportedly based on reason, that the relationship should be,
not neutralist, but one of positive, though non-preferential, support; and
(b) an Absolute Separatist position, purportedly based on a Jeffersonian
figure of speech (the wall of separation between Church and State), that
the relationship should be, not neutralist, but one of mutual non-recog-
nition. For ease of reference, I shall designate the Separatist position
* A.B. (1931), Georgetown University; J.D. (1937), Professor of Law, Loyola
University School of Law, Chicago, Ill.
as the POAU position, because that organ-
ization (Protestants and Other Americans
United for the Separation of Church and
State) has been most prominently identi-
fied with that position in the public eye.
Let me restate the three positions in











JON C. HAYES support: we recog-
nize your existence
and we support your sectarian educational
activities without preference or discrimina-
tion.
I. Constitutional Law: relationship of
neutrality: we recognize your existence, and
we neither hinder nor help your sectarian
educational activities. We won't support
you, but we won't get in your way either.
III. POA U: no relationship: we ignore
your existence, and therefore we ignore
your sectarian educational activities. Nat-
urally, we won't support you, and we will
act without any recognition of, or regard
for, any adverse effect of our action on
your activity.
My purpose in this article is to examine
those three positions and to formulate them
as accurately and as professionally as I can
in the hope that, once so formulated in
parallel structure, analytical comparison
and contrast may enable us., if not to com-
pose, then at least to explain the differences
in the three positions. For uniform speci-
ficity, I shall use the parochial school of
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elementary and secondary level (whether
Catholic, Lutheran, Episcopalian, or Jew-
ish) as the embodiment of sectarian
religious instruction by the Church. This
parochial school offers its pupils sectarian
instruction within a curriculum of secular
subjects of study, all of which are in some
sense permeated by the particular sectarian
belief. And this parochial school exists as
the selected agent of the parents of its pupils
to achieve the total formal education of
these pupils on the elementary and sec-
ondary levels. i shall examine two legal
aspects of the parochial school: (a) its
right (if any) to exist in the State; and (b)
its right (if any) to State tax support.
Hence, I propose to formulate the three
positions (Natural Law, Constitutional
Law, POAU) on the right (if any) of paro-
chial schools to exist in the State, and on
the right (if any) of the parochial schools
to State tax support.
I should add that by natural law, I mean
the very simple concept of the Creator
legislatively saying to His physically-free
human creatures: "Be what your reason
tells you that you are. Hence, be what I
made you. Be yourself, as your own reason
discovers and discloses yourself to you."
Natural law, then, is essentially composed
of the dictates of reason establishing what
in a given case conforms or does not con-
form to man's human nature (considered
not only in itself, but also in its essential
relationship to its Creator, to its fellow
man, and to subordinate creatures) and
obliging each man to do some of those
things which conform and to avoid doing
all of those things which do not conform.a
And by the State, I simply mean society
politically organized and therefore pos-
Encyclical Letter of Leo XIII, Libertas Praestan-
tisshnum (1888).
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
sessed of civil authority, to be wielded by
the power arm of government in such a
way as to achieve the end for which the
State exists, namely, the common good in
the temporal order to the extent permitted
by subsidiarity. -
A. The Right of the Parochial School
to Exist in the State
The three positions on this topic are
substantially the same. While approaches
and points of emphasis differ, the common
acceptance of the legal right of the paro-
chial school to exist in the State is based
upon a substantial acceptance of the view
that the child does not belong to the State;
rather, the State must serve the child and
must do so under the direction and control
of the parent. On the other hand, both
parent and child have the- obligation of
seeing to it that the special interest of the
State in the education of the child is prop-
erly served.
I. The Natural Law position was ad-
mirably expressed (together, incidentally,
with the Constitutional Law position) by
the Catholic Bishops of the United States
in their 1955 Annual Statement, which ob-
served that the primary right of the parent
to educate his child was established in
American law and was basic to the very
definition of freedom. That right was, more-
over, antecedent to any human law, vested
in the very nature of a parent, demanded
as a fulfillment of his parenthood, and
reflective of the inviolability of his human
person and of his dignity and freedom
under God. The conclusion was that relig-
ious (and private) education in the United
'Encyclical Letter of Pius XII, Summni Pontifica-
tus (1939). For a very helpful collection of Papal
excerpts, see PAPAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE
POLITICAL ORDER (Powers ed. 1952).
States rests upon the law of nature as well
as upon the law of the land. This same
conclusion had been expressed by Pope
Pius XI in his Encyclical on the Christian
Education of Youth; and the same Pontiff
had reaffirmed the Natural Law position a
year later in his Encyclical on Christian
Marriage.3 Additional authority for the
same conclusion is forcefully presented by
LeBuffe and Hayes.4
On December 1, 1955, the Report of the
Committee for the White House Confer-
ence on Education, discussing Topic V,
recognized the right of parochial schools
to exist to implement the primary right of
parents to educate their children in such
schools. As the basis for these rights, the
report referred to "The American Tradi-
tion of Education." On December 6, 1955,
the Wall Street Journal editorially expressed
concern over the designated basis, and
stated that it would have been more reas-
suring if the Conference had reasserted the
right "for what it is, a right fundamental
to liberty and not merely one graciously
extended by sufferance." ' The Journal
thought that there were not a few educators
who had their own private reasons for
wishing to reduce the basis of the right
from one of law to one of currently toler-
ated social custom. But this minority effort
of some educators, plus some persistent
sniping about the "divisiveness" of paro-
chial schools,' is the extent of the slight
opposition to the legal position, both in
'Encyclical. Letters of Pius XI, Rappresentanti in
Terra (1929) and Casti Connubii (1930).
'LEBUFFE & HAYES, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 284-94 (4th ed. 1947). See also 2 CRONIN,
THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS 394-97 (1917).
Editorial, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 6, 1955,
p. 14, cols. 1-2.
'For the opposed view, see the 1955 Annual State-
ment of the Catholic Bishops of the United States.
Natural Law and in Constitutional Law,
on the right of parochial schools to exist
in the American State.
But what one does notice is an undue
emphasis on the limitations which attach to
this right of parochial schools to exist for
the purpose of implementing the primary
parental right to direct and control the
education of the child. That both rights
are limited is again the common legal posi-
tion, both in Natural Law and in Constitu-
tional Law. The qualification was carefully
expressed in the 1919 Annual Statement of
the Catholic Bishops of the United States,
which reminded the nation that the basic
right involved was the right of the child
itself, who, owing to his nature and his end,
needed education in order to fulfill the
Divine Plan for him; hence, the best wel-
fare of the child qualifies the parental right.
And so does the independent right of the
State to have the child so educated as to be
a citizen capable of performing his civic
duties and of living in the cultural milieu of
his times. In addition, the ordinary State
police power controls parents, teachers, and
pupils; and -the State owes the child the
duty of protecting the child's right to an
education against any default or neglect on
the part of the parent, and also owes child
and parent and itself the duty of checking
on the parochial school to see that the child
is actually receiving there the necessary
education to enable it to discharge its civic
duties and to attain the immediate end for
which it was created. 7
II. The Constitutional Law position on
the right of parochial schools to exist in
'Woelfl & O'Shaughnessy, A Double Revolution?,
25 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (1955). See also Woelfl
& Forkins, The Federal Government and Public
School Desegregation: An Inquiry Into Principles,
18 U. DET. L. J. 393 (1954-55).
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the State is the same position as that of the
Natural Law; and is based on the same
grounds. Contrary to popular belief, the
basic case establishing the constitutional
position (basic because it first establishes
the fundamental proposition of primary
parental rights) is not Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,s but Meyer v. Nebraska,9 in which
Mr. Justice McReynolds expressed the de-
cision of the Court that a Nebraska state'
criminal statute (forbidding the teaching in
any school in Nebraska of any modern
language other than English to any child
who had not successfully passed the eighth
grade) violated the Fourteenth Amendment
in that it constituted state action depriving
the plaintiff German teacher (who was
teaching reading in German in a parochial
elementary school operated by the Zion
Evangelical Lutheran Congregation) of his
liberty without due process of law.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, still speaking
for the Court, then held that the Meyer
case controlled four cognate cases dealing
with similar state statutes and collectively
reported under the title of Bartels v. Iowa.10
In three of these four cases the plaintiffs
in error were foreign language teachers in
parochial schools, while in the fourth case
the plaintiff was a school operator. Two
Justices (Holmes and Sutherland) dissented
on the ground that the statutes were not
so unreasonable a restraint on the liberty
of teachers or scholars as to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment when one regarded
the several states as sociological -experi-
mental laboratories.
Two years later in the more famous
Pierce case, Mr. Justice McReynolds,
speaking, for an unanimous Court, held
'268 U.S. 510 (1925).
'262 U.S. 390 (1923).
"o 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
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that, under the Meyer doctrine, an Oregon
statute (in effect compelling attendance
of normal children at public elementary
schools only) violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because it constituted an un-
reasonable interference with the liberty of
parents to direct the education of their
children, which offense, when the parents
were regarded as patrons of the private and
parochial schools operated by the plaintiff
corporations, in turn constituted an un-
reasonable deprivation of the property of
the plaintiffs.
After another two years, Mr. Justice
McReynolds, once again speaking for an
unanimous Court in Farrington v. Toku-
shige," held that the fundamental rights
of owners, parents, and children, which
had been held under the Meyer-Pierce doc-
trine to be protected against adverse state
action by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, were equally pro-
tected against adverse federal territorial
action by the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment..
In all these cases, the basic doctrine of
the Meyer case coritrolled: private and
parochial schools have the right to exist in
the State and the property rights of their
owners and of their teachers are entitled
to protection, because of the primarily
protected rights of the child to an educa-
tion and of the parent to direct and control
that education for his own child. Mr.
Meyer's right to teach reading in German
"and the right of parents to engage him so
to instruct their children . . . are within
the liberty of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'12 It was evident that "the legisla-
ture has attempted materially to interfere
with the calling of modern language teach-
U273 U.S. 284 (1927).
"262 U.S. at 400.
ers, with the opportunities of pupils to
acquire knowledge, and with the power of
parents to control the education of their
own. ' 13 In the Farrington case, the enforce-
ment of the Territorial Act would probably
have destroyed most, if not all, of the
private foreign language schools; "and, cer-
tainly, it would deprive parents of a fair
opportunity to procure for their children
instruction which they think important and
we cannot say is harmful. The Japanese
parent has the right to direct the education
of his own child without unreasonable re-
strictions; the Constitution protects him as
well as those who speak another tongue.' 14
In the Pierce case, the Oregon statute,
under the Meyer doctrine, unreasonably
interfered with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the education of the
children under their control. The funda-
mental theory of liberty in the United States
excludes any general power in a state to
standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers
only. "The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and pre-
pare him for additional obligations.' 15 As
a simple consequence, the property rights
of the plaintiff corporations are entitled to
be protected against the unreasonable com-
pulsion exercised by the state over their
present and future patrons. The plaintiffs
ask, and must be accorded, protection
against an arbitrary, unreasonable, and un-
lawful interference with their patrons by
the state, for the reason that such inter-
ference results in equally arbitrary, unrea-
"1 Id. at 401.
273 U.S. at 298.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925).
sonable, and unlawful' damage to the
plaintiffs' property.
Hence, while the State may within limits
regulate parochial schools, it may not de-
stroy them, because their owners and their
teachers have property rights which cannot
be taken away by statutes which accom-
plish that result through an unlawful inter-
ference with the primary natural right and
duty of the parent to direct and control the
education of his child.1" The basic illegality,
therefore, is the unreasonable interference
with the primary rights of parent and of
child in and to education; where that illegal
interference produces a property loss to
school owners and to school teachers, such
property loss is equally illegal. The paro-
chial school has an immuity from destruc-
tion by the State, because the rights of
parent and of child in education are para-
mount.
This Meyer-Pierce doctrine has not been
directly attacked; there is no formal dis-
senting POAU position. But the basis of
the doctrine (i.e., the primary right of
parent and child in education) has been
persistently sniped at. The chief method
has been to insist that the legal primacy of
the parental educational duty and right is
mere dictum; hence, the-doctrine has no
firmly established basis in federal Constitu-
tional Law and may be represented merely
as an American tradition or as a social
custom currently in vogue. It is submitted,
however, that the parental primacy is not
dictum but rather the most fundamental
holding in the Meyer-Pierce line of cases,
because the proposition is the essential
basis of the specific holding. The specific
16 For a very effective judicial formulation of the
parental right and its limitations, see People ex
rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. App. 276, 255
Pac. 610 (1927).
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holding was that the property rights of the
plaintiff school owners and school teachers
were illegally taken without due process of'
law by governmental action; but the sole
reason why the plaintiffs' property rights
were illegally taken was that the statutes
first infringed the primary rights of parent
and of child in education. And because that
statutory interference with the primary
rights of parent and child violated due
process, the consequential interference with
the property rights of the plaintiffs also
violated due process. Except for the former
holding, the latter cannot be made. It fol-
lows that the former is not mere dictum
nor a mere added ground of decision, but
is rather itself the basis of decision. It is
true, of course, that neither parents nor
children were parties to any of these cases
and that the plaintiffs as property owners
had no status to represent or to litigate the
different personal interests of the parents
and the children; but the only conclusion
from that observation is that the holding,
though binding as precedent, is not itself
res judicata as to the rights of parents or
children.
More subtly, the effort to identify the
substantive scope of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment with those
rights only which are guaranteed in and by
the First Amendment would tend to under-
mine the Meyer-Pierce doctrine. In the
Meyer case, the Court said that the term
"liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment
denoted not merely the individual's freedom
from bodily restraint but also his right to
contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowl-
edge, to marry, to establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God accord-
ing to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long
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recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. Few of the freedoms in that stirring
litany are expressly included in the First
Amendment.
It has also been suggested, as noted, that
the rights of the State in education must
be accorded a larger scope under modern
conditions, to the necessary impairment of
the parental rights; 17 and again, that the
meticulous observance of parental rights
has entailed consequences (such as "divi-
siveness") of more serious detriment to the
State. Neither of these suggestions is likely
to be taken seriously.
One further observation is important
owing to the stature of the observer. John
Courtney Murray, S.J.,18 has thought that
the Meyer-Pierce doctrine of parental pri-
macy was seriously undermined by having
been ignored by the United States Supreme
Court in the decision of McCollum v.
Board of Education.": The thought is that,
if the Meyer-Pierce doctrine meant what it
said about parental control of the education
of the child, the McCollum decision ought
to have gone the other way. Mrs. McCollum
had the parental right to control the educa-
tion of her son Terry, but not the education
of the children of all the other parents in
the school district; on the contrary, those
other parents had the right to control. the
education of their own children (without,
of course, attempting to control Terry
McCollum).
But the McCollum case was not treated
from the approach of parental control; it
was treated as a parental request for a type
1 Miller, Racial Discrimination and Private
Schools, 41 MINN. L. REV. 145, 148-57 (1957).
" Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 23 (1949).
'- 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
of state aid which the state lacked the
power to extend. It is clear, of course, that
the failure of the state to use tax money to
assist the parochial school in its function-
ing as the selected agent of some parents
necessarily impairs the significance of the
recognition by the same state of the primary
right of those parents to direct and control
the education of their children, especially
when the same state offers full tax assis-
tance to the public school in its functioning
as the selected agent of other parents. But
the justification advanced is that, under the
"no establishment" clause of the First
Amendment, the State is powerless to re-
spond to the request of the former parents,
whereas it may and therefore must respond
to the request of the latter parents. In short,
the State's recognition of the primacy of
parental control of the education of chil-
dren cannot fairly be regarded as compro-
mised by the simple inability of the State
to respond to the type of assistance re-
quested. If I love you and then you say,
"Because you love me, come to me," I do
not love you the less for not responding if
I am paralyzed. The real flaw, of course,
lies in having held that such a response is
ultra vires the State.
Only Mr. Justice Jackson seems aware
that the Meyer-Pierce doctrine is involved
at all; and he thinks that the McCollum
principle is a necessary corhplement to the
full recognition of the Meyer-Pierce doc-
trine. This contradictory approach must
amaze Father Murray. Mr. Justice Jackson
in effect says to the parochial school par-
ents: "Precisely because you won the Meyer
and Pierce cases, you must lose the McCol-
lur case. You cannot have it both ways;
and frankly, I think you have nothing to
complain about, because you won the
greater victory."
Fully developed, Mr. Justice Jackson's
line of thought is as follows:
1. If religion is a private (i.e., non-
public) concern, then religion is simply
beyond the competence of the State to
control; but, for the same reason, it is
equally beyond the competence of the State
to assist. Whereas,
2. If religion is a public concern, then it
is within the competence of the State to
assist religion; but, for the same reason,
it is equally within the competence of the
State to control religion.
3. But the fact is that the Meyer-Pierce
doctrine constitutes a decision that religion
(i.e., parochial schools) is not within the
competence of the State to control because
it is a private concern.
4. Therefore, it is equally beyond the
competence of the State to assist religious
instruction, and the McCollum decision
must so hold.20
Once Mr. Justice Jackson's position is
thus spelled out in detail, the basic fallacy
is easily discerned: the parallel competen-
cies simply do not follow. If, for example,
the State's lack of competence to control
necessarily involves an equal lack of com-
petence to assist, then our whole Point Four
program is unconstitutional, as is our mem-
bership in the United Nations.
The distinction may be phrased as fol-
lows: the function of the State is to pro-
mote the common good in the temporal
order within the principle of subsidiarity. It
follows that the State has no competence
to act in the eternal or supernatural order.
But, acting in its own proper temporal
order, the State may perform an act which
will indirectly have an effect in the eternal
order (the area of State incompetence),
. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
25-28 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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because man in the temporal order is still
a spiritual being. This indirect effect may
either benefit religion or harm it. Whether,
in either case, the State may perform the
act within its own area of competence de-
pends upon the application of the ethical
principle of the double effect.
To conclude, it is submitted that Mr.
Justice Jackson's thinking on the inter-
relationship of the Meyer-Pierce doctrine
and the McCollum doctrine was in error,
and that Father Murray's apprehension
must be directed to the construction of the
"no establishment" clause which makes any"
assistance to religion ultra vires the State.
In summary: (1) the Meyer-Pierce doc-
trine is firmly established both in Natural
Law and in federal Constitutional Law;
and (2) there is no substantial opposed
position, but merely sporadic efforts to un-
dermine the legal authority of the doctrine.
B. The Right of the Parochial School
to State Tax Support
While, then, there is substantial agree-
ment between the federal Constitutional
Law and the Natural Law positions in
respect of the right of parochial schools to
exist in the State by reason of the primary
parental right to direct and control the
education of the child, and while there is
no serious departure from this position on
the part of POAU, there is a fundamental
cleavage among all three positions in re-
spect of the right of the parochial school
to state tax support. Since the Constitu-
tional Law position lies somewhere in
between the other two positions, it is con-
venient to begin by formulating that posi-
tion, and then to continue by formulating
each of the other two positions in parallel
expression.
The positions will be formulated in ac-
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cord with what the writer believes to be the
key distinction in the discussion: the differ-
ence between the willing state and the
unwilling state. Where the state wants to
extend tax support to the parochial school,
the problem is whether or not it may do so.
On the other hand, where the state does
not want to extend tax support to the
parochial school, the problem is whether
or not it must do so. It is obvious that the
entire federal constitutional discussion so
far has been centered on the legal justifica-
tion of the willing state; the matter of
coercing the unwilling state has received
scant attention, and then only in state con-
stitutional discussions. It is impossible to
overemphasize the necessity and utility of
this basic distinction in the orderly discus-
sion of the several positions.
I. The Constitutional Law Position:
a. The State is never under any obliga-
tion to extend any public aid what-
ever to the parochial school (beyond
the basic community services, such as
police and fire protection and water
and sewage services, performed for
every legal person in the community);
and
b. Even if the State wants to extend pub-
lic aid to the parochial school, it still
may not do so directly and affirma-
tively, but it may do so either indi-
rectly or negatively. And the concept
-of indirect aid involves a dual indirect-
ness: first, the public aid is indirect in
the sense that the parochial school
itself is not the direct object of the
aid, but rather the aid is directly ex-
tended for a public purpose to parent
and pupil; and second, the public aid
is indirect in the sense that it is not
directly related to the essential opera-
tion of the parochial school as such.
I. The POAU Position:
a. The State is never under any obliga-
tion to extend any public aid whatever
to the parochial school; and
b. Even if the State wants to extend pub-
lic aid to the parochial school, it may
not do so, whether the public aid be
direct or indirect, affirmative or nega-
tive, preferential or non-preferential,
or for a public purpose or not.
III. The Natural Law Position (aspects
inverted for convenience):
b. If the State wants to extend public aid
to the parochial school in any form
whatever, it may always do so non-
preferentially, because such non-pref-
erential aid would always subserve
a public purpose; and
a. Even if the State does not want to ex-
tend any public aid to the parochial
school, under certain limited circum-
stances it is nevertheless obligated to
do so.
The POAU position is the unqualified,
fully-extended principle of the McCollum
case; the Constitutional Law position is the
principle of the McCollum case as qualified
up to now by the Everson and the Zorach2'
decisions. The McCollum case not only
confirmed the Everson case in placing the
"religion" clauses of the First Amendment
squarely within the "due process" clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment so as to make
them applicable to all the states, but it also
placed a new construction on the "no estab-
lishment" clause by picking up a dictum
in the Everson opinion and making it the
holding of the McCollum case: the "no
establishment" clause means, not only that
no state may extend any preferential aid
to any one religion, but also that no state
'Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
may extend any aid even non-preferentially
to all religions. "The 'establishment of re-
ligion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government . . . can pass laws
which ... aid all religions .... '-22 Hence,
literally, even if a state wants to achieve an
independent public purpose by extending
some form of aid to all religions non-prefer-
entially, it may not do so. Specifically, since
that is exactly what the state agency did in
aAd under the Champaign plan of released-
time religious education for pupils in the
Champaign public schools, the plan was
unconstitutional. Whether this McCollum
principle is constitutionally correct or in-
correct is not within the scope of this
article. 2": The point here is that, correct or
incorrect, it is the constitutional law, and
that is what is now being formulated..
The ideological basis for the McCollum
principle is the absolute incompetence of
the State to act in the field of religion, so
that any State action in that field is ultra
vires the State. An action taken by the State
within its proper field of competence may
indirectly produce an effect, either benefi-
cial or harmful, within the field of compe-
tence of the church - and vice versa. If
'this indirect effect is beneficial to the
Church, there would seem to be no objec-
2' Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15
.(1947), partially quoted in McCollum v. Board
of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948).
"That the McCollum principle is neither histori-
cally correct nor currently practiced by the Ameri-
can people has been fully demonstrated by eminent
scholars such as Professor James M. O'Neill; Pro-
fessor Edward S. Corwin; Wilfrid Parsons, S. J.:
Robert C. Hartnett, S. J.; Robert Drinan, S. J.;
and Msgr. Joseph H. Brady. For a penetrating
analysis suggesting that the fundamental problem
is historical confusion over the proper function of
a public school in a religiously pluralistic society,
see McCluskey, Spiritual Values in Public Schools,
95 AMERICA 619 (1956).
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tion to the act; but if harmful to the
Church, then whether the act may be per-
formed will depend upon the ethical prin-
ciple of the double effect. The point here
is that the State does not lack competence
to perform an act within its proper field of
competence simply because that act also
indirectly produces an effect within a field
of incompetence; and this conclusion is
especially true when the indirect effect is
beneficial. Hence, the ideological basis for
the McCollum principle is unsound.
The McCollum principle, which was a
mere dictum in the Everson case, was quali-
fied by the holding of that case, because
the state aid extended in that case to the
parochial school was not an establishment
of religion and was not therefore unconsti-
tutional. That aid was indirect in the dual
sense: It was directly extended to the parent
and the pupil for the public purpose of
assisting them in their discharge of a state-
imposed duty; and the aid was not directly
related to the essential operation of the
parochial school as such. Moreover, the aid
was so clearly citizen-oriented that Mr.
Justice Black saw that the withholding of
such aid on account of the religion of some
of the recipients would itself impair a
deeper freedom of parent and pupil: the
free exercise of their religion.
This latter observation has been excep-
tionally well developed in a brilliant article
by former Dean Wilber G. Katz of. the
University of Chicago Law School. 24 Dean
Katz's thesis is that the State may aid re-
ligion non-preferentially without thereby
creating an establishment of religion when-
ever not so to aid religion would be to
impair some person's free exercise of re-
ligion. This test provides both a rationale
"The Freedom to Believe, 192 THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 66 (1953).
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and a rule of thumb, and is based on the
common sense principle that every social
restraint must be justified by an increase in
social freedom.
The Zorach decision (that the New York
City plan of released-time religious educa-
tion did not constitute an "establishment of
religion") also modifies the McCollum
principle. True, the modification may be
explained on a policy basis as mere com-
pensation for the McCollum decision, or
the two cases may be easily distinguished.
But simply because the Zorach fact situa-
tion is not identical with the McCollum
fact situation does not prove that the aid
offered by the state to sectarian religious
instruction in the Zorach case was not im-
proper within the McCollum principle.
Prescinding from the "pendulum" policy
distinction, and searching the Zorach opin-
ion for a valid ideological distinction, one
can discover the concept that all that the
state was actually doing in Zorach was
electing to stay out of the way of religion.
The "aid" in the Zorach case can therefore
be regarded as negative in character. Essen-
tially, the state was simply electing to take
no action, and it is difficult for the state to
be ultra vires by doing nothing. While this
suggested construction of the Zorach deci-
sion has been criticized, no other concep-
tual suggestion explains -how Zorach and
McCollum can be true together; and that
they are true together is the Court's opinion
as expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas when
he said for the majority that, despite the
Zorach decision, the Court adhered to the
McCollum principle. 25
The property tax exemption extended by
states to parochial schools seems an excel-
lent example of non-preferential state aid
" Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
which is negative in character. But it is also
indirect in a third sense not heretofore
stated. Though direct in the two senses
already mentioned (because such aid is
extended directly to the parochial school
and not directly to parent or pupil, and
because aid is also directly related to the
operation of the parochial school as such),
it is indirect in that such aid is extended to
the parochial school, not because it is paro-
chial, but because it is a school. Hence, in
Illinois, for example, such state aid to a
parochial school has been held constitu-
tional not so much because it is negative
as because it is still in some sense indirect. 26
The case which will really test the validity
of the "negative" aid construction of the
Zorach decision will be the case in which
there is a federal constitutional objection
to a state property tax exemption for church
property devoted exclusively to Divine
worship.
It was thought that the United States
Supreme Court might take the opportunity
to rule on the federal constitutionality of a
California property tax exemption for paro-
chial schools by accepting for review the
case of Lundberg v. County of Alameda.2"
But the Court in a per curiam decision
dismissed the appeal for want of a substan-
tial federal question. 28 Some think that this
ruling means that a state property tax
exemption to a parochial school does not
constitute an establishment of religion. This
conclusion appears unjustified in view of
the absence of citation and in view of the
fact that the principal issue of the case in
"People ex rel. Marsters v. Rev. Saletyni Mis-
sionaries, Inc., 409 I11. 370, 99 N.E. 2d 186 (1951).
' 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P. 2d 1 (1956).
2 Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921
(1956).
the California state courts was the construc-
tion of a California statute.
At least one more qualification of the
McCollum principle seems predictable. Just
as the State can clearly extend to parochial
schools the fire, police, water, and sewage
services extended to all legal persons in .the
community and so deal with such schools
on a community basis, so it would seem
that the State could also deal with parochial
schools on an ordinary business basis, just
as it would with any other legal person -
for example, by lending money to a paro-
chial school on the same basis as that on
which it would lend money to any other
legal person. This proposition is the hold-
ing in a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.2 9 Should the tax-
payer in a comparable case seek and receive
review by the United States Supreme Court
under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court would be in
a position to make this anticipated qualifi-
cation of the McCollum principle.
In summary, the Constitutional Law
position is the McCollum principle as modi-
fied to permit the State, if it so wishes, to
extend either indirect or negative aid to the
parochial school, and to sustain the same
community and business relationships with
the parochial school as it may sustain with
any other legal person - all, however, with-
out any obligation to extend such aid if it
does not wish to do so.
No cases are known to the writer which
litigate the element of State obligation -
in which, that is, the parochial school or the
parent or pupil has attempted to coerce
the unwilling State. Presumably, the legal
argument employed would be the violation
of the equal protection clause of the Four-
' Schade v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 386 Pa.
507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956).
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teenth Amendment. In detail, the argument
would run like this: By using tax money
to support an areligious public school sys-
tem while it the same time refusing non-
preferential tax support to all religious
schools, the State violates the equal pro-
tection of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, because the classification is
unreasonable. And the classification is un-
reasonable because it indirectly violates
both the primary right of the parent to
direct and control the education of his
child, and the right of child and parent to
the free exercise of their religion.
Discussing, finally, the Natural Law po-
sition, we recall that it not only justifies the
extension by the State of direct and affirma-
tive aid to the parochial school, but it also
requires the State in distributive justice to
furnish certain aid under limited circum-
stances. This obligation of the State in
distributive justice, is twice referred to by
Pope Pius XI in His Encyclical on the
Christian Education of Youth.30 The con-
cept is well developed by Michael Cronin
as follows: 31 The end of the State is to
provide for the temporal common good to
the extent to which it is not readily attain-
able by the individual or by the family.
While the primary duty of educating the
child is on the parent, that duty today will
normally be beyond the resources of the
parent. Hence, the parent is justified in
asking the State for some aid, and the State
is under the obligation to respond by pro-
viding those facilities for educating the child
which, though reasonably necessary, are
beyond the command of the parent. It may
be that such facilities are wholly beyond
'oEncyclical Letter of Pius XI, Rappresentanti in
Terra (1929).
812 CRONIN, THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS 394-97
(1909).
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the reach of the parent so that the State
would be obliged to supply them fully; even
then, the State is merely responding to the
reasonable necessity of child and parent.
Should the State respond by providing
facilities which are for good reason unac-
ceptable to parent and child, and assuming
that other acceptable responses are pos-
sible, the State has no right to insist on
making one response only, but is obliged
to make the additional response.
In their 1955 Annual Statement, the
American Catholic Bishops did not refer
to this obligation of the State in distributive
justice. They did point out the equal right
of the parochial school pupil to the indirect
benefits supplied by the states to all pupils
generally. And they also pointed out both
the need for, and the propriety of, direct
aid to the parochial school and its parents
and pupils. But they then observed that
practical considerations, in view of wide
religious differences, almost from the outset
prevented American tax-supported schools
from following the pattern of similar
schools in certain other countries in which
the parochial school shares equally and
directly with the public school in State
educational assistance. 32
The federal constitutional objection, of
course, both to the voluntary extension of
direct aid to the parochial school and to
the recognition of any obligation to extend
' Of course, such direct aid to a parochial school
must always serve an accepted public purpose,
viz. the secular education of the pupils in the paro-
chial school. The state, for instance, is not asked
to extend such direct aid to a theological institute.
See HARTNETT, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN
(1947).
such direct aid is that such action would
constitute a clear establishment of religion
in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The ideological objection is
that such action would therefore be ultra
vires the state. It would seem therefore that
the Natural Law position requires the state
to violate the Federal Constitution. Assum-
ing arguendo that this objection to the
Natural Law position is valid, how else can
even more serious (through indirect) viola-
tion of the Constitution be avoided, viz.,
the violation of the primary parental right
to educate the child under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the violation of the right
of both parent and child to the free exer-
cise of their religion under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Conceivably, this dilemma could be re-
solved by having the State cease all support
of any school, but this suggestion ignores
the State's own fundamental interest in hav-
ing the child educated to the point neces-
sary for the effective discharge of his civic
duties. That end, indeed, is concededly
essential; but the means employed are not.
The solution could be for the State to fur-
nish aid, not to any school at all, but to the
parent and to the child, allowing them to
establish whatever schools they wish, pro-
viding always that the State's own interest
in an educated citizenry is achieved. Such
a program of State aid would attain the
State's purpose and fulfill the State's obliga-
tion without involving any action ultra vires
the State. Or the solution could be to apply
Dean Katz's test to determine when to sub-
ordinate the McCollum principle to the
more fundamental free exercise of religion.
